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Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, defendants/appellees, Mark 0. Van Wagoner and Kathryn 
Van Wagoner, by and through their counsel of record, hereby 
petition the Court for a rehearing in the above-captioned matter 
following the Court's Opinion of March 27, 1992.l This petition 
is based upon points of law and fact which the Court overlooked 
or misapprehended in its Opinion. 
X. PETITION SUMMARY. 
Defendants request a rehearing on the grounds that: 
1. Rather than review the trial court's Findings of 
Fact under the "clearly erroneous" standard, the Court engaged in 
selective fact finding of its own. 
2. The Court reviewed the trial court's Conclusions 
of Law by a standard not in place the time of the trial court's 
judgment or, alternatively, the Court created a new undesirable 
standard for unilateral mistake which supplants the Utah Supreme 
Court's standard. 
1
 A true and correct copy of the Court's March 27, 1992, 
Opinion is attached hereto as Exhibit "A". 
1 
3. The Court created a new, undesirable legal 
standard for reliance 
II. THE APPELLATE COURT HAS EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION BY 
ENGAGING IN A FUNCTION RESERVED FOR THE TRIAL COURT. 
The Court's Opinion states that the plaintiff did not 
"dispute the trial court's finding of fact."2 While it is true 
that plaintiff made no attempt to muster evidence from the record 
to support a challenge to the Findings of Fact, plaintiff could 
not challenge the trial court's legal conclusion regarding 
unilateral mistake, without challenging the facts. For example, 
the plaintiff could not leave the trial court's Finding of Fact 
No. 30 which states, in pertinent part: 
In the course of negotiations between the 
defendant and Carol Klas, there existed the 
Devere Kent appraisal valuing the property 
at $165,000, the existence of which was 
unknown to defendants, and if known, would 
have made a material difference in their 
offer to buy the subject property. This was 
a unilateral mistake on the part of 
defendants which was fundamental and 
substantial. The Devere Kent appraisal was 
never provided by Carol Klas in spite of 
defendants' requests for copies of 
appraisals. 
2
 Curiously, the Court's Opinion acknowledges a challenge to 
the Findings of Fact in its footnote on page 3. 
2 
Plaintiff also had to challenge the trial court's Finding of 
Fact No, 31 which statesf in pertinent part: 
The defendants considered the price of 
$175,000 as being a reasonable price for the 
property in question at the time the offer 
to purchase was submitted and executed by 
them, based upon the representations made by 
Carol Klas and without the benefit of the 
Devere Kent appraisal. 
(A true and correct copy of the trial court's Amended Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law is attached hereto as Exhibit "B") . 
Nowhere in plaintiff's brief, or in the Court's Opinion, is 
there an indication that the trial court's Findings of Fact Nos. 
30 and 31 are clearly erroneous. Indeed, as defendant's brief 
points out, there is ample evidence in the record to support 
those Findings as well as the other findings supporting the 
judgment. (See Appendix "A" to Brief of Appellees at pages Il-
ls, attached hereto as Exhibit "C"). 
A. The Trial Court's Findings Of Fact Are Unchallenged. 
According to the Court's Opinion, "Essentially, plaintiff 
does not dispute the trial court's Findings of Fact, but 
challenges the trial court's application of the doctrine of 
unilateral mistake." (Exhibit "A" at p. 4). That being the 
3 
case, the Court should have accepted the trial court's Findings 
of Fact as valid and reviewed the trial courtfs Conclusions of 
Law based upon those Findings of Fact. ,fIf the appellant fails 
to marshall the evidence, the appellate court assumes that the 
record supports the findings of the trial court and proceeds to 
review the accuracy of the lower court's conclusions of law and 
the application of that law in the case." Crouse v. Crouse, 817 
P. 2d 836 (Ut. Ct. App. 1991) (quoting Saunders v. Sharp. 806 P. 2d 
198, 199 (Utah 1991). 
B. Ignoring The Trial Court's Findings Of Fact, The 
Court's Opinion Creates New Findings Of Fact. 
Rather than review the evidence which supported the trial 
court's Findings of Fcict, the Court's Opinion engages in 
selective fact finding of its own. For example, as indicated 
above, the trial court's Finding of Fact Nos. 30 and 31 indicate 
that defendants relied on the representations made by Carol Klas 
with regard to the value of the property cind that the existence 
of the appraisal not disclosed by plaintiff's representative 
would have made a material difference to defendants. In short, 
the trial court found that the non-disclosure of the Kent 
appraisal was fundamental and substantial to the underlying 
contract. Of course, the Court's Opinion points out that 
plaintiff does not challenge these Findings of Fact. 
4 
Nonetheless, the Court's Opinion ignores the trial court's 
Findings of Fact and imposes its own finding: 
Because defendants, after arms length 
negotiations with plaintiff, agreed to 
purchase the property for a price within the 
range set by plaintiff, we conclude that 
defendants' ignorance of the existence of 
the Kent appraisal valuing the property at 
$165,000 would not render the enforcement of 
the agreement unconscionable. (Exhibit "A" 
at p. 7). 
Here, the Court finds that the existence of the Kent 
appraisal was immaterial. Yet the trial court found that the 
existence of the Kent appraisal was "fundamental and substantial" 
and "would have made a material difference in [defendants'] offer 
to buy the subject property." (Exhibit "B" at Finding of Fact 
No. 30) . The Court's Opinion does not indicate the trial court's 
Finding of Fact was clearly erroneous, the Opinion simply issues 
a different finding of fact. 
The trial court's Findings of Fact also indicate that 
In the course of defendants' contact with 
Carol Klas, prior to August 11, 1987, 
references were made to the effect that she 
understood "appraisals" have been made in 
the range of $175,000 to $192,000. 
(Exhibit "B" at p. 4, Finding of Fact No. 
7). 
5 
The Court's Opinion takes issue with this Finding of Fact 
and states "it is clear from the record that both Carol Klas and 
Mark Van Wagoner understood the range of those appraisals to 
begin at $170,000, not at $175,000." (Exhibit "A" at p. 3, n.3). 
Under the proper standard for review, the Court1s Opinion should 
have reviewed the record in order to determine if there was any 
evidence in the record which supported the trial court's Finding 
of Fact. Absent such support, the Court could have found that 
the trial court's finding was clearly erroneous. In this case, 
however, the record clearly contains evidence which supports the 
trial courtfs Finding of Fact No. 7. The testimony of Kathryn 
Van Wagoner indicates that the appraisal range from $175,000 to 
the low $190,000 area. (Transcript Vol. II, at p. 148, 1. 15-25, 
p. 149, 1. 1-12) (see Exhibit "C" at p. 5) .3 The trial court 
found Ms. Van Wagonerfs testimony credible and compelling and 
made its Finding of Fact accordingly. This Court's conclusion 
that this Finding of Fact is clearly erroneous cannot be based on 
a lack of evidentiary foundation in the record, it must be the 
product of the Court's judgment of the credibility and weight 
afforded the evidence. This function is reserved for the finder 
of fact, in this case, the trial court. 
3
 Although plaintiff failed to marshall the evidence in 
regard to this Finding of Fact, Appendix A to the brief of 
appellees (Exhibit "C" herein) is an annotation of the trial 
court's Amended Findings of Fact. The annotation cites to 
testimony in the record which supports the trial court's Findings 
of Fact. 
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A third point where the Courtfs Opinion substitutes its 
judgment regarding a Finding of Fact for that of the trial court 
is found on page 8, footnote 7 of the Court's Opinion. There the 
Court states: 
In light of our conclusion that both parties 
understand the appraisals to range from 
$175,000 and up, we likewise to do not 
consider the $5,000 difference between the 
Kent appraisal and the lowest of the three 
informal appraisal to be an unconscionable 
difference. (Exhibit at p. 8) (Emphasis 
added). 
Here the Court has displaced the trial court's Finding of 
Fact that the existence of the "Devere Kent appraisal valuing the 
property at $165,000 . . . was unknown to defendants, and if 
known, would have made a material difference in their offer to 
buy the subject property." (Exhibit f,BM at p 10). 
The function of the trial court is to hear the relevant 
testimony, weigh that testimony and then resolve conflicts and 
make inferences necessary to reach supportable findings of fact. 
By contrast, the function of the Appellate Court is limited to 
determining whether any evidence (or inferences therefrom) 
support the trial court1s Findings. By disregarding the clearly 
erroneous standard, this Court exceeded its jurisdiction and 
deprived the trial court of its essential function. "In 
7 
determining whether a finding is clearly erroneous, due regard is 
given to the trial court to evaluate the credibility of witnesses 
since it is not [the Court of Appeals1] function to determine 
conflicting evidence or the reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom." State v. Ford, 818 P.2d 1052, 1054 (Ut. Ct. App. 
1991). 
The proper inquiry on the appellate courtfs part is whether 
there is any evidence in the record which supports the trial 
court's Finding of Fact, not whether there is evidence in the 
record which could support a different finding of fact. Id. ("We 
do not assess facts de novo on appeal.11) Given that both the 
plaintiff and the Court have admitted that there is no challenge 
to the facts, this case should be reheard based on the facts 
found by the trial court. 
III. THE COURT'S OPINION RETROACTIVELY APPLIES A NEW STANDARD FOR 
UNILATERAL MISTAKE OR CREATES A NEW STANDARD WHICH SUPPLANTS 
THE STANDARD SET BUY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT. 
The trial court issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law with regard to unilateral mistake in May of 1990. 
Accordingly, the trial court applied the standard for unilateral 
mistake set forth in Guardian State Bank v. F. C. Stanql, 778 
P.2d 1 (Utah 1989). In Stanql, the Supreme Court agreed with, 
8 
and adopted, Professor Corbin's formulation of the law of 
unilateral mistake: 
There is particularly universal agreement 
that, if the material mistake of one party 
was caused by the other, either purposely or 
innocently, or was known to him, or was of 
such a character and accompanied by such 
circumstances that he has reason to know of 
it, the mistaken party has a right to 
rescission. (Emphasis added). 
Guardian State Bank v, F.C. Stanal, 778 P.2d at 12. 
Following the standards set forth by the Supreme Court in 
Stanal. the trial court concluded that: 
(1) The Van Wagoners were mistaken in their 
understanding that the lowest existing 
appraisal on the property was $175,000. 
(2) Their mistake was caused by their 
misunderstanding of the representations made 
by Carol Klas, and the failure to have the 
Devere Kent appraisal provided in a timely 
manner. 
(3) The mistake was substantial and 
fundamental to the proposed agreement 
between the defendants and plaintiff. If 
the Van Wagoners had been aware of the 
undisclosed, lower appraisal, it would have 
made a material difference in their offer to 
buy the property. (Exhibit MB" at p. 11). 
9 
Though charitable to plaintiff, the language of the trial court's 
Conclusions of Law follows the Supreme Court standard for 
unilateral mistake as set forth in Stangl. 
A. The Court*8 Opinion Ignores The Stanal Standard And 
Retroactively Applies Its Own Standard, 
The standard for unilateral mistake as set forth in Stangl 
has not been overruled, yet the Court's Opinion applies a more 
restrictive standard set forth in Grahn v. Gregory* 800 P.2d 320 
(Ut. Ct. App. 1990) . The application of Grahn creates two 
problems. First, it wrongly places the burden upon the trial 
court's Conclusions of Law to meet a standard which did not even 
exist until five months after the trial court made those 
conclusions of law based on Stangl. Certainly, the trial court 
did not err in applying the standards set forth in Stangl. 
B. The Court's Opinion Purports To Overrule Stangl. 
The second problem created by this Court's application of 
Grahn is that it holds the Stangl standard to be insufficient, 
thus, findings following Stangl do not sustain a unilateral 
mistake judgment. If that is the Court's position, it should be 
made sufficiently clear to afford the parties and courts of this 
State appropriate guidance and opportunity for review. 
10 
In either event, Appellees1 respectfully suggest a rehearing 
is appropriate to clarify the record• 
IV. BY CREATING MEW FINDINGS OF FACT REGARDING DEFENDANTS1 
RELIANCE, THE COURT'S OPINION MISAPPLIED THE STANDARD FOR 
UNILATERAL MISTAKE. 
Even if the Court should hold the trial court1s Conclusions 
of Law to the more restrictive Grahn standard, the Court's 
Opinion improper selective fact finding misapplies the standard 
for unilateral mistake. The Court's Opinion on unilateral 
mistake focuses on two of the four criteria for unilateral 
mistake under Grahn: unconscionability and diligence. Under both 
theories, the Court's Opinion centers on the reasonableness of 
defendants' reliance on the misrepresentations of plaintiff's 
agent. 
A. Defendants' Reliance Was Justified and Plaintiff's 
Misrepresentation Makes Enforcement of the Agreement 
Unconscionable. 
Unless this Court admits finding different facts, it must 
base its conclusion of unconscionability on the facts found by 
the trial court, namely: 1) the existence of the Kent Appraisal 
was significant; 2) defendants lack of knowledge regarding the 
existence of the appraisal was material; 3) that plaintiff knew 
of the appraisal; and 4) that Carol Klas failed to disclose it. 
11 
These facts compel a legal conclusion of unilateral mistake, as 
found by the trial court. If these Findings of Fact are not 
clearly erroneous, the trial courts judgment should stand. 
B. The Court's Opinion Creates An Unreasonable Standard 
For A Buyer's Diligence, 
By contrast, the Courtfs Opinion states that defendants 
should not have relied upon the statements of plaintiff's 
representative, a neighbor of the Van Wagoners, but should have 
obtained an appraisal on the underlying property themselves. 
(Exhibit "A" at p. 9). 
Again, this Court ignored the trial court's findings that 
Carol Klas failed to inform defendants that the property had been 
appraised at a value as low as $165,000, a fact which she knew4 
and which, if known to defendants, would have made a substantial 
difference to them in entering into this contract. The Court's 
new facts set a standard that a buyer cannot rely on a statement 
made by a seller, without further acts by the buyer to 
independently test the seller's representations. That standard 
effectively eliminates reliance. 
4
 Transcript, Vol. II, at p. 130, 1. 8-23; see Exhibit "C" 
at pages 4-5 re: Finding of Fact No. 5. 
12 
C* The Court's Opinion Ignores Kathryn Van Wagoner's 
Reliance, 
1. Kathryn Van Wagoner Is A Separate Individual 
Party. 
The Court's Opinion indicates that defendant should not have 
elied upon the representations of plaintiff's agent because Mark 
an Wagoner is an attorney with experience in real estate 
latters. (Exhibit "A" at p. 9). The Opinion, however, ignores 
he issue of the reasonableness of Kathryn Van Wagoner's reliance 
n the statements of plaintiff's agent* As indicated above, it 
as Kathryn Van Wagoner, a non-lawyer, who testified as to Carol 
las' representations regarding the value of the property. 
Exhibit "C" at p. 5). 
Kathryn Van Wagoner has an identity separate and apart from 
hat of Mark Van Wagoner. She is named as an individual 
efendant in this matter and has defenses and counterclaims which 
hough similar, are separate from those of Mark Van Wagoner. The 
:ourt's Opinion directs its comments regarding the expertise and 
experience of the buyer towards Mark Van Wagoner. It completely 
gnores Kathryn Van Wagoner as if she did not exist apart from 
ter husband. 
13 
2. Imputed Knowledge Should Be Applied Consistently 
To Both Parties. 
If the Court intends to transfer Mr. Van Wagoner1s status as 
an attorney to Mrs. Van Wagoner, it also should transfer Mr. 
Klas1 knowledge as a mortgage banker to Mrs. Klas. Indeed, it is 
grossly inequitable to state that Kathryn Van Wagoner, as the 
spouse of an attorney, is assumed to have the knowledge of an 
attorney, but that Carol Klas, the former spouse of a mortgage 
banker, is a layperson and has no idea what the term "appraisal" 
means. All defendants seek is the equal application of the 
principal of imputed knowledge. If the knowledge of Mark Van 
Wagoner as an attorney is imputed to Kathryn Van Wagoner, the 
knowledge of John Klas as mortgage banker must be imputed to 
Carol Klas. 
3. Acting As A Unit, Plaintiff And Carol Klas 
Deceived Defendants. 
John Klas, a mortgage banker, clearly understood the term 
"appraisal" and the distinction between an appraisal and an 
opinion of value. Loans are not granted based on opinions. When 
John Klas discussed with Carol Klas of the range of "appraisals" 
for the home, they both knew about Kent appraisal. Nonetheless, 
the price was established based on a range of opinions which 
ignored the only appraisal the Klases obtained. 
14 
Taken together, the actions of John and Carol Klas evidence 
more than a seller setting a price range for his property and his 
agent misconstruing the term "appraisal". This only could have 
been a plan to withhold the only true appraisal of the property 
from prospective buyers, even in the face of the Van Wagoners' 
direct, specific inquiry. 
V. CONCLUSION. 
For the reasons stated above, defendants respectfully 
request a rehearing. 
DATED this *zUr day of April, 1992. 
VAN WAGONER & STEVENS 
Lewis T. Stevens 
Alexander H. Walker III 
Kristin G. Brewer 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 21st day of April, 1992, I 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing APPELLEES' 
PETITION FOR REHEARING to be mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
Cory R. Wall 
WALL & WALL 
9 Exchange Place #800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
klas.pet 
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EXHIBIT A 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
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John H. Klas , 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Mark O. Van Wagoner and 
Kathryn Van Wagoner, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 900493-CA 
F I L E D 
(March 27, 1992) 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Raymond S. Uno 
Attorneys: Brant H. Wall and Cory R. Wall, Salt Lake City, for 
Appellant 
Lewis T. Stevens, Alexander H. Walker, and Kristin G. 
Brewer, Salt Lake City, for Appellees 
Before Judges Billings, Orme, and Russon. 
ORME, Judge: 
Plaintiff, John H. Klas, appeals from the trial court's 
ruling entitling defendants to rescission of an Earnest Money 
Sales Agreement, challenging the trial court's determination that 
the defendants made a unilateral mistake. Defendants also seek 
clarification on the issue of damages and attorney fees on 
appeal. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. 
FACTS 
This matter was tried to the court on May 9, 10, and 12 of 
1989. The court thereafter rendered its Memorandum Decision 
concluding that defendants had breached the Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement and that plaintiff was entitled to damages, interest, 
costs, and attorney fees. After a period of almost one year of 
objections, motions for new trial, and conflicting proposals for 
findings, conclusions, and judgment by both sides, the trial 
court entered a judgment allowing defendants to rescind the 
subject agreement on the basis of unilateral mistake by the 
defendants.1 
Inasmuch as there is no serious dispute concerning the 
findings of fact, the essential facts are taken from the lower 
court's findings. 
In July of 1987, defendants, Mark 0. Van Wagoner and his 
wife, Kathryn Van Wagoner, attended an "open house" held by Carol 
Klas, the former wife of plaintiff, John Klas. Carol Klas had 
undertaken to sell the subject property, which was owned by 
plaintiff pursuant to a Divorce Decree that awarded the property 
to plaintiff as his sole and separate property. The Divorce 
Decree provided that if, prior to September 1, 1987, Carol Klas 
could find a buyer willing to purchase the property at a price 
and upon terms acceptable to plaintiff, she would receive a 
finder's fee of 3% of the gross sale price. Following the open 
house, defendants expressed interest in purchasing the property. 
In August of 1987, Mark Van Wagoner, who is an attorney, 
prepared and delivered to Carol Klas an Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement (the Agreement) wherein defendants offered to purchase 
the property for $175,000. The Agreement included an integration 
clause and specified that the offer was subject to no 
contingencies, exceptions, or conditions of sale other than what 
was set forth in the Agreement.2 Carol then presented the offer 
to plaintiff. 
Upon receiving the Agreement, plaintiff reviewed the written 
proposal with his attorney. Plaintiff's attorney then telephoned 
Mark Van Wagoner to review the document. At this time the 
parties discussed and made modifications to the Agreement. 
Plaintiff then executed the Agreement and delivered it to Mark's 
office. Defendants signed the document on August 11, 1987, and 
the parties agreed to a September closing date. 
Prior to the August 1987 signing of the Agreement, 
defendants inquired of Carol Klas about appraisals of the 
property. Carol expressed to defendants her understanding that 
1. There followed additional objections to the Findings, 
Conclusions and Judgment, together with motions to amend the 
same. On May 31, 1990, the court entered its Amended Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law which clarified factual issues, but 
resulted in the same legal conclusion as the March 13, 1990 
Judgment. 
2. A provision conditioning the contract upon buyers' obtaining 
financing was expressly deleted. 
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several "appraisals" had been made and that they ranged from 
$170,000 to $192,000.3 The trial court found that there was an 
apparent misunderstanding between defendants and Carol regarding 
the term "appraisals." While defendants understood the term to 
mean formal, written appraisals, Carol's testimony indicates that 
she considered any opinion, whether verbal or written, given as 
to the value of the property to be an "appraisal," The 
appraisals to which Carol referred later proved to be informal 
opinions as to the market value of the property solicited by 
plaintiff from several personal acquaintances in the real estate 
business. One of these was in letter form; the others were 
merely verbal. 
At no time prior to their signing the Agreement did 
defendants request that plaintiff produce written appraisals of 
the property, although, as indicated, they mistakenly assumed the 
"appraisals" referred to by Carol Klas were formal, written 
appraisals.4 Only after signing the Agreement did defendants 
affirmatively demand copies of the appraisals to which Carol had 
referred. Plaintiff was at first unresponsive, but after 
learning that an appraiser engaged by defendants' prospective 
lender had valued the property at $137,000, plaintiff provided 
defendant with a copy of a fourth "appraisal," and the only 
formal written appraisal, prepared for plaintiff. 
That appraisal, prepared by Devere Kent, valued the property 
at $165,000 but was older than the other "appraisals" referred to 
by Carol Klas. It had been prepared earlier in connection with a 
loan application made by plaintiff, prior to the divorce and 
plaintiff's decision to sell. Throughout the course of 
3. Plaintiff questions the trial court's finding that the three 
appraisals to which Carol Klas referred ranged from $175,000 to 
$192,000. It is clear from the record that both Carol Klas and 
Mark Van Wagoner understood the range of those appraisals to 
begin at $170,000, not $175,000. Thus, we conclude that the 
trial court's finding that the three appraisals ranged from 
$175,000 and up was clearly erroneous. Bell v. Elder, 782 P.2d 
545, 547 (Utah App. 1989). 
4. "Appraisal" may have a different, more precise connotation in 
contemporary real estate parlance. However, Carol Klas was not a 
real estate agent or broker. In general usage, appraisal means 
"an act of estimating or evaluating . . . especially] by someone 
fitted to judge"; "a valuation of property by the estimate of an 
authorized person." Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 105 
(198 6). The three "appraisals" Carol had in mind were estimates 
furnished by Larry Payne, Howard Badger, and Vic Ayers, all of 
whom were in the real estate or mortgage lending business. 
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negotiations with Carol Klas, defendants were unaware of the 
existence of this appraisal, and believed that the lowest 
appraisal referred to by Carol was the lowest existing appraisal 
of the property. 
In early October of 1987 defendants, through their counsel, 
notified plaintiff of the withdrawal of their offer to purchase 
the property and demanded the return of the earnest money 
deposit. Plaintiff then notified defendants that if they failed 
to consummate the purchase of the property within ten days, the 
property would be placed on the market in an effort to mitigate 
damages and that defendants would be responsible for any damages 
sustained. Defendants failed to finalize the purchase of the 
property, and plaintiff thereafter placed the property on the 
market. The property was sold in April of 1988, for $160,000, 
and plaintiff sued defendants to recover the difference between 
the Agreement price and the fair market value. 
At trial, defendants basc>d their refusal to consummate the 
purchase of the subject property upon the fact that, if known, 
the Kent appraisal would have made a material difference in their 
offer to buy the subject property. Defendants claimed this was a 
unilateral mistake on their part entitling them to rescission of 
the Agreement. Eventually, the trial court agreed with 
defendants, and concluded that the unilateral mistake provided a 
basis for rescission of the Agreement. Accordingly, the court 
held that no damages were recoverable by plaintiff, and dismissed 
plaintiff's complaint. The court also dismissed defendants' 
counterclaim requesting relief on the grounds of fraud, mutual 
mistake of fact, and detrimental reliance.5 Plaintiff appealed, 
challenging the trial court's application of the law in 
permitting rescission of the Agreement on the basis of unilateral 
mistake. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Essentially, plaintiff does not dispute the trial court's 
findings of fact, but challenges the trial court's application of 
the doctrine of unilateral mistake. The issue before us, then, 
is whether the trial court erred in its legal conclusion that 
defendants were entitled to rescission of the Agreement on the 
basis of unilateral mistake. "If a trial court interprets a 
contract as a matter of law, we accord its construction no 
5. Defendants sought an award of punitive damages, costs, and 
attorney fees on their claims for fraud and detrimental reliance, 
and sought cancellation or rescission of the Agreement as relief 
on their claim for mutual mistake. 
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particular weight, reviewing its action under a correctness 
standard." Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985). 
Accord 50 West Broadway Assocs. v. Redevelopment Agency of Salt 
Lake City, 784 P.2d 1162, 1171 (Utah 1989); Copper State Leasing 
Co. v. Blacker Appliance & Furn. Co.. 770 P.2d 88, 90 (Utah 
1988) . Moreover, the trial court/s legal conclusions "are 
accorded no particular deference; we review them for 
correctness." Bellon v. Malnar. 808 P.2d 1089, 1092 (Utah 1991) 
(quoting Grayson Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson. 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 
1989)) . 
UNILATERAL MISTAKE 
This court has identified four criteria that must be 
satisfied before rescission on the basis of unilateral mistake 
will be permitted: 
1. The mistake must be of so grave a 
consequence that to enforce the contract 
as actually made would be unconscionable. 
2. The matter as to which the mistake 
was made must relate to a material 
feature of the contract. 
3. Generally the mistake must have 
occurred notwithstanding the exercise of 
ordinary diligence by the party making 
the mistake. 
4. It must be possible to give relief by 
way of rescission without serious 
prejudice to the other party except the 
loss of his bargain. In other words, it 
must be possible to put him in status 
quo. 
Grahn v. Gregory, 800 P.2d 320, 327 (Utah App. 1990). See 
generally Guardian State Bank v. Stangl, 778 P.2d 1, 4-5 (Utah 
1989) (discussing evolution of doctrine of unilateral mistake). 
In applying these factors to the trial courts findings of fact, 
we conclude that at least two of the four elements required to 
sustain the trial court's rescission of the Agreement have not 
been met. 
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A. Unconscionability 
First, we are not convinced that the alleged mistake was so 
grave as to render enforcement of the Agreement as made 
unconscionable- Concerning unconscionability, the Utah Supreme 
Court has stated that "a duly executed written contract should be 
overturned only by clear and convincing evidence." Resource 
Management Co. v. Weston Ranch and Livestock Co., 706 P.2d 1028, 
1043 (Utah 1985). In determining unconscionability, "a court 
must assess the circumstances of each particular case in light of 
the twofold purpose of the doctrine, prevention of oppression and 
of unfair surprise." Id. at 1041. Courts analyze 
unconscionability in terms of "procedural" and "substantive" 
unconscionability. Id. 
Procedural unconscionability focuses on the "relative 
positions of the parties and the circumstances surrounding the 
execution of the contract." Jones v. Johnson, 761 P.2d 37, 39 
(Utah App. 1988) (quoting Bekins Bar V Ranch v., Huth. 664 P. 2d 
455, 461 (Utah 1983)). Procedural unconscionability occurs 
"where there is an absence of meaningful choice and where lack of 
education or sophistication results in no opportunity to 
understand the terms of the agreement." Johnson, 761 P.2d at 39. 
Substantive unconscionability occurs when contract terms are "so5 
lopsided as to unfairly oppress or surprise an innocent party," 
id. at 40, or where there is "an overall imbalance in rights and 
responsibilities imposed by the contract, excessive price or a 
significant cost-price disparity, or terms which are inconsistent 
with accepted mores of commercial practice." Id. 
In the instant case, defendants' alleged mistake as to the 
value of the property did not result from any procedural 
unconscionability. The trial court's findings show that the 
parties dealt at arms length. Defendant Mark Van Wagoner, an 
attorney, testified at trial that he was experienced in real 
estate transactions and that he had participated in many closing 
transactions with real estate agents.6 Prior to signing the 
Agreement, defendants engaged in discussions with Carol Klas 
regarding the value of the home, fully aware that she was 
financially interested in effecting a sale. Defendants were 
informed by Carol that plaintiff would only accept an offer 
within the range of the three appraisals to which she had 
referred—from $170,000 to $192,000—and only if there were no 
exceptions, contingencies, or conditions attached thereto. 
Defendants assented to those terms, and tendered a form of 
6. There was also testimony presented at trial that Mark had 
previously owned a home in the neighborhood where the subject 
property is located, and that he lived there until 1985. 
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agreement of their own choosing. It is apparent that both 
parties were essentially in equal bargaining positions, and that 
the circumstances surrounding the execution of the Agreement were 
not oppressive. Thus, any surprise on defendants' part was not 
unfair. 
Similarly, the terms of the Agreement were not "so lopsided 
as to unfairly oppress or surprise an innocent party." Id. The 
Utah Supreme Court has stated that 
sellers and buyers should be able to 
contract on their own terms without the 
indulgence of paternalism by the courts 
in the alleviation of one side or another 
from the effects of a poor bargain. They 
should be permitted to enter into 
contracts that may actually be 
unreasonable or which may lead to 
hardship on one side. 
Park Valley Corp. v. Baglev, 635 P.2d 65, 67 (Utah 1981). In the 
instant case, both parties bargained for and clearly understood 
the terms of the Agreement. Prior to preparing the Agreement, 
defendants were advised by Carol Klas that plaintiff would not 
approve of any exceptions or conditions to the Agreement, nor any 
offer lower than the range of appraisals referred to by Carol. 
The Agreement signed by both parties contained a notation that no 
special considerations or contingencies existed relative to the 
written Agreement. Accordingly, there was no provision in the 
Agreement conditioning the purchase upon production of any 
written appraisals by plaintiff or of the property appraising at 
any particular value. The parties freely bargained for these 
terms and assented to them by executing the Agreement. 
The Agreement's price of $175,000 fell within the range of 
informal appraisals valuing the subject property from $170,000 to 
$192,000. The record indicates that plaintiff relied on a 
variety of factors, including the three informal appraisals, to 
determine the value of his property. These factors formed the 
basis for his asking price, as well as his acceptance of 
defendants' offer. Under the rationale stated in Baglev, 
plaintiff was entitled to formulate the sales price of his home 
in the manner of his choice, just as defendants were entitled to 
base their offer on their own opinion of the value of the 
property. Because defendants, after arm's-length negotiations 
with plaintiff, agreed to purchase the property for a price 
within the range set by plaintiff, we conclude that defendants' 
ignorance of the existence of the Kent appraisal valuing the 
property at $165,000 would not render enforcement of the 
Agreement unconscionable. 
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In addition, we conclude that, even considering the Kent 
appraisal, the sales price was not itself unconscionable. First, 
the $10,000 difference between the Kent appraisal, valuing the 
property at $165,000, and defendants' offer of $175,000 can 
hardly be termed "grave" or "unconscionable."7 Second, the trial 
court specifically found that defendants considered their 
offering price of $175,000 to be reasonable. Third, despite its 
conclusion that rescission was proper on the basis of unilateral 
mistake, the trial court made no finding suggesting that the 
difference between the sale price and the Kent appraisal 
constituted grave circumstances such that enforcement of the 
Agreement would be unconscionable. Finally, we note that 
defendants have cited no authority, nor set forth a persuasive 
argument, to support their conclusion that the difference between 
the sale price and the Kent appraisal constituted grave 
circumstances sufficient to render enforcement of the Agreement 
unconscionable. For these reasons, we conclude that the 
consequence of defendants' alleged mistake was not so grave as to 
render enforcement of the Agreement unconscionable. 
B. Buyer's Diligence 
Jumping to the third element necessary to sustain rescission 
on the ground of unilateral mistake, we find that defendants' 
conduct did not rise to the level of ordinary diligence required 
to rescind a contract on the basis of unilateral mistake. In the 
course of negotiations between the parties prior to signing the 
Agreement, defendants were aware of the existence of three 
"appraisals" valuing the subject property. While defendants did 
not know that these "appraisals" were only informal expressions 
of opinion, they did know that plaintiff would not entertain an 
offer below the lowest of the quoted figures. However, the trial 
court found that during these negotiations, defendants made no 
attempt to secure an independent appraisal on the subject 
property. Defendants contend that their reliance on Carol Klas's 
representations as to the three alleged appraisals excused their 
failure to obtain additional appraisals of the subject property 
prior to executing the Agreement. Specifically, defendants 
contend, and the trial court found, that defendants' mistaken 
belief that the lowest existing appraisal on the property was 
$170,000 was caused by Carol Klas's representations and failure 
to have the Kent appraisal provided in a timely manner. We are 
not persuaded. 
7. In light of our conclusion that both parties understood the 
appraisals to range from $170,000 and up, we likewise do not 
consider the $5,000 difference between the Kent appraisal and the 
lowest of the three informal appraisals to be an unconscionable 
difference. 
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Defendants had ample opportunity, if materially concerned 
about the value at which the property would appraise, to have the 
property appraised during the two-week time period between the 
time of their initial inspection of the property and the time 
they executed the agreement. The record indicates that, during 
this two-week period, defendants saw fit to have architects, 
decorators, and electricians examine the property. Yet, they did 
not engage an appraiser to assess the value of the home until 
they attempted to obtain financing after executing the Agreement. 
Furthermore, we find it unreasonable, especially given Mark Van 
Wagoner's professional training and experience in real estate 
law, for defendants to have failed to obtain an independent 
appraisal prior to executing the Agreement, or to have 
conditioned the obligation to purchase on the property appraising 
at a particular level, jLf they were truly concerned about the 
property's appraised value. Because defendants failed to conduct 
a reasonable investigation of the subject property's market value 
prior to executing the Agreement, defendants' conduct did not 
rise to the level of ordinary diligence required to establish 
unilateral mistake. 
Accordingly, because defendants failed to fulfill two of the 
four elements necessary to justify rescission on the basis of 
unilateral mistake, the trial court erred in concluding that 
defendants were entitled to rescission of the Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement on the basis of unilateral mistake.8 See, e.g., John 
Call Engineering v. Manti City Corp.. 743 P.2d 1205, 1209-10 
(Utah 1987) (absent showing that enforcement of sewer 
construction project contract would be unconscionable, that city 
had exercised due care in executing contract, and that rescission 
of contract would not seriously prejudice engineer, contract 
would not be rescinded on grounds of unilateral mistake); Davis 
v. Mulholland. 475 P.2d 834, 835 (Utah 1970) (remedy of 
rescission on basis of unilateral mistake improper where any 
8. Not every unilateral mistake entitles the buyer to relief. 
We note that even if defendants' misunderstanding of Carol Klas's 
representations did amount to unilateral mistake, the facts 
suggest that defendants bore the risk of mistake as to the value 
of the subject property. Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
§ 154 (1981) explains that a party bears the risk of mistake when 
"(a) the risk is allocated to him by agreement of the parties, or 
(b) he is aware, at the time the contract is made, that he has 
only limited knowledge with respect to the facts to which the 
mistake relates but treats his limited knowledge as sufficient." 
Defendants were aware, upon entering into the Agreement, that 
they had only "limited knowledge" with respect to the value of 
the home. 
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mistake on plaintiff's part was due entirely to plaintiff's own 
negligence).9 
Accordingly, we hold that the parties executed a valid 
contract, influenced by no legally cognizable unilateral mistake 
on the part of defendants. This agreement bound defendants to 
purchase the subject property, with "no exceptions." In refusing 
to consummate the sale, defendants materially breached the 
Agreement, thereby entitling plaintiff to recover damages. 
PLAINTIFF'S DAMAGES 
In its final judgment, the trial court did not address the 
issue of damages because of its ruling based on unilateral 
mistake. In the trial court's Memorandum Decision of May 30, 
1989, however, the court ruled that plaintiff's damages should be 
limited to $7,500. However, the trial court did not specify how 
it arrived at this figure. "The measure of damages for breach of 
contract for the conveyance of land is the difference between the 
contract price and the market value at the time of the breach." 
Terrv v. Panek. 631 P.2d 896, 897 (Utah 1981). See D. Dobbs, 
Handbook on the Law of Remedies § 12.11 at 853 (1973). 
In the instant case, defendants offered to pay $175,000 for 
the subject property in August of 1987. When defendants failed 
to consummate the purchase of the property, plaintiff placed the 
property for sale on the open market, and on April 13, 1988, sold 
the property for $160,000, a figure well above the value stated 
9. In light of our determination that defendants' conduct did 
not rise to the level of ordinary diligence, it follows that the 
trial court correctly dismissed defendants' counterclaim for 
fraud and misrepresentation. "Fraud as related to purchase of 
real estate may not be predicated on alleged fatlse statements the 
truth of which could have been ascertained with reasonable 
diligence by the party asserting their falsity," Sokolosky v. 
Tulsa Orthopaedic, Inc. Pension Trust, 566 P.2d 429, 431 (Okl. 
1977) (quoting Onstott v. Osborne, 417 P.2d 291, 293 (Okl. 
1966)). Defendants could have ascertained with reasonable 
diligence the truth or falsity of Carol Klas's alleged 
misrepresentations by requesting copies of the appraisals, or 
demanding to know the basis for her information, or by obtaining 
an independent appraisal of the subject property prior to 
executing the agreement. Since the means of knowledge were 
available to defendants and since they failed to avail themselves 
of these means, they cannot now claim to have been deceived by 
the representations of the vendor. See Sokolosky, 566 P.2d at 
431. 
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in defendants' appraisal. The trial court found that $160,000 
was the "highest and best price available in the market place" at 
the time of the sale. However, the trial court's findings do not 
specifically address whether this price represented the market 
value of the property at the time defendants breached the Earnest 
Money Sales Agreement, which was some seven months prior to the 
sale. The trial court made no finding as to the market value of 
the property at the time of defendants' breach. Plaintiff is 
entitled to recover the difference between the contract price and 
the market value of the property at the time of the breach. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
In its first Memorandum Decision of May 30, 1989, the trial 
court concluded that defendants breached the Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement, and that plaintiff was entitled to damages and 
interest, costs, and attorney fees. In August of 1989, the 
parties entered a Stipulation allowing the court to assess 
attorney fees in the sum of $6,250 against defendants "should the 
trial court's award of attorney's fees be sustained or otherwise 
upheld on appeal." However, after a period of almost one year of 
objections, motions for new trial, and new proposed Findings, 
Conclusions and Judgment by both sides, the trial court entered 
its Amended Judgment of July 3, 1990, allowing defendants to 
rescind the Earnest Money Sales Agreement on the basis of 
unilateral mistake. Accordingly, in its July 3, 1990 Amended 
Judgment, the trial court awarded no attorney fees. We reverse 
the lower court's final Amended Judgment on the issue of 
unilateral mistake. We conclude, as did the trial court in its 
first Memorandum Decision, that defendants breached the Earnest 
Money Sales Agreement. Plaintiff is therefore entitled to 
attorney fees as specified in the stipulation as well as 
reasonable attorney fees incurred on appeal. See e.g.. 
Management Servs. Corp. v. Development Assoc, 617 P.2d 406, 408-
09 (Utah 1980). 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's judgment allowing defendants to rescind 
the Earnest Money Sales Agreement on the basis of unilateral 
mistake is reversed. We remand to the trial court with 
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instructions to enter judgment in favor of plaintiff, to fix 
appropriate damages, and to award plaintiff attorney fees 
consistent with thJLs decision. 
Gregory^K. Orme, Judge 
WECONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
Leonard H. Russon, Judge 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN H. KLAS, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
v s . 
MARK 0 . VAN WAGONER and 
KATHRYN VAN WAGONER, 
D e f e n d a n t s . 
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
CIVIL NO, C - 8 8 - 3 1 9 2 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial to 
the bench, the Honorable Raymond S. Uno, presiding on May 9 and 
10, 1989, with final argument being made and submitted to the 
Court on May 12, 1989. The plaintiff was present and 
represented by his counsel, Brant H. Wall, and the defendants 
were present and represented by their counsel, Lewis D. Stevens 
and Craig W. Anderson. Witnesses were duly sworn and 
testified, evidence introduced, and upon submission of final 
arguments, the matter was duly submitted to the Court for 
decision. The Court having taken the matter under advisement 
and having duly considered all of the evidence, testimony, 
pleadings, stipulations, arguments, and other matters presented 
in the course of said trial, and being thus fully advised in 
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the premises, the Court made and entered its Memorandum 
Decision on the 30th day of May, 1989, and counsel for the 
plaintiff having thereafter prepared and submitted Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment, and counsel for the 
defendants having thereafter filed Objections to the proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, together with a Motion 
to Amend Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and for a New 
Trial; the plaintiff having thereafter responded to said 
Objections and Motion for New Trial, and the defendants having 
filed a reply to plaintiff's response to the defendant's 
Objections to proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Lav/, 
and Motion for New Trial, and the plaintiff thereafter 
responded to the defendants7 Reply to plaintiff's Response to 
Objections to proposed Findings and Conclusions, and the Court 
having reviewed all of the pleadings and Memoranda filed by the 
parties in support of their respective positions, and the Court 
having made and entered its Supplemental Memorandum Decision, 
dated the 4th day of November, 1989, and directing counsel for 
the plaintiff to prepare and submit Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Judgment in conformity therewith, and 
the Court thereafter having amended paragraph 13 of the 
Findings of Fact, which does not alter the Conclusions of Lav/ 
or Judgment, the Court now makes and enters the following: 
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AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The property which is the subject of this action is a 
parcel of real estate located at 2340 Berkley Street, Salt Lake 
City, Utah. 
2. At all times relevant to the issues involved, the 
plaintiff John H. Klas was the owner in fee simple of said 
property. 
3. In late July or early August, 1987, the subject 
property was offered for sale pursuant to the terms of a Decree 
of Divorce in Civil No. D-86-1705, in the District Court of 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
4. Pursuant to the provisions of the aforesaid Decree of 
Divorce, the former wife of the plaintiff, Carol Klas,-
undertook the marketing of the property and said property was 
not listed with a real estate broker- The plaintiff John H. 
Klas did not set a specific asking price for the property. 
5. In 1986, plaintiff acquired an appraisal by Devere 
Kent (the Kent appraisal) for mortgage loan purposes. That 
appraisal showed a market value of $165,000. In anticipation 
of the sale of said property in 1987, plaintiff had personal 
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acquaintances, engaged in real estate practice, provide opinion 
appraisals on the current value of the property which were oral 
in nature, and used by plaintiff as a basis for establishing 
the market value for sale of the property. Said opinion 
appraisals ranged from $175,000 to $192,000, 
6. In late July or early August, 1987, the defendants 
inspected the property in the presence of Carol Klas and 
expressed an interest in acquiring the property. 
7. In the course of defendants' contact with Carol Klas, 
prior to August 11, 1987, references were made to the effect 
that she understood "appraisals11 had been made in the range of 
$175,000 to $192,000, which defendants believed to be of a 
v/ritten nature, however, there is a dispute whether plaintiff 
or Carol Klas represented that "written11 appraisals existed. 
8. On or about August 7, 1987, the defendant Mark Van 
Wagoner, who is an attorney, prepared and delivered an Earnest 
Money Sales Agreement to Carol Klas, dated August 7, 1987, and 
bearing the date of August 11, 1987, as the date of signature 
by the parties. Said agreement was not based upon any 
misrepresentation by plaintiff or Carol Klas. 
9. Carol Klas presented the offer to her former husband, 
John H. Klas. who accepted the same on August 11, 1987, and a 
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closing date of September 15, 1987 was agreed upon by the 
parties and the premises were vacated in anticipation of the 
closing. The sales price for the premises was $175,000, which 
v/as the lowest price of the opinion appraisals provided by 
Carol Klas. 
10. Plaintiff and defendants executed the Earnest Money 
Sales Agreement on August 11, 1987. 
11. The integrated clause contained in the Earnest Money 
Sales Agreement, dated August 7, 1987, brings together all of 
the understandings and agreements of the parties and there can 
be no variance except by mutual agreement of the parties. 
12. At no time on or prior to August 11, 1987, did the 
plaintiff engage in any discussion with the defendants relative 
to the subject transaction and at no time on or prior to August 
11, 1987 was any request made by the defendants to plaintiff 
for the production of an appraisal of the property, except, 
however, pursuant to paragraph 4 above, defendants negotiated 
directly with Carol Klas and asked her to obtain an "appraisal11 
and she requested the same from plaintiff. 
13. A series of negotiations intervened, and what was 
understood by the defendants as a counter offer was made to the 
defendants through Mr. Cowley, after which the defendants 
failed to meet the closing date of September 15, 1987, and 
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defendants notified the plaintiff that they did not intend to 
consummate the purchase of the property. 
14. The plaintiff then listed the property with a real 
estate broker on or about September 29, 1987, at an asking 
price of $174,500. 
15. On or about October 2, 1987, the defendants through 
their counsel gave formal written notice to the plaintiff of 
the withdrawal of their offer to purchase the property and 
demanded the return of the earnest money deposit, which earnest 
money deposit was thereafter refunded and returned to the 
defendants. 
16. In approximately mid-October, 1987, plaintiff gave 
defendants notice that if they failed to consummate the 
acquisition and purchase of the property within ten (10) days, 
the property would be placed on the market in an effort to 
mitigate damages and that defendants would be responsible for 
any damages sustained. 
17. The defendants failed to consummate the purchase of 
the property and on December 15, 1987, the plaintiff returned 
the earnest money deposit of $1,000, at which time the 
defendants were further notified by plaintiff that he would 
look to said defendants for any damages, if such should occur. 
18. The property was placed for sale in the open market 
for a period of several months during which period of time a 
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bona fide and diligent effort was made to locate a buyer or 
otherwise sell the property at its fair market value, and on 
April 13, 1988,. said property was sold to one David B. Boyce, 
at a price of $160,000, which was then the highest and best 
price available in the market place. 
19. Defendants were unaware of the "Kent" appraisal and 
v/ere under the belief that the lowest appraisal referred to by 
Carol Klas was the lowest appraisal on the property. "The 
"Kent11 appraisal, if known to the defendants, would have made a 
material difference in their offer to buy the subject property. 
20. At no time did the plaintiff have any knowledge or 
notice that the defendants were relying on any alleged 
representations made by Carol Klas and at no time did the 
plaintiff make any representation relative to the fair market 
value of the property other than by signing and accepting the 
Earnest Money Sales Agreement submitted by the defendants, 
dated August 11, 1987. However, defendants negotiated with 
plaintiff through Carol Klas pursuant to paragraph 4 above and 
pursuant to plaintiff and Carol Klas' understanding the range 
would be the property value of the three highest "appraisals." 
21. The defendants did not rely upon any representations 
made by the plaintiff pertaining to the fair market value of 
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the subject property prior to the execution and signing of the 
Earnest Money Agreement, dated August 11, 1987, handled by 
plaintiff's attorney, James P. Cowley, except for 
representations made by Carol Klas, and the first contact which 
occurred between the plaintiff and the defendants was on the 
execution of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement which was on 
August 17, 1987. 
22. Although the defendants had opportunity to investigate 
the issue of fair market value of the property prior to 
execution of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement of August 7, 
1987, they continued to rely upon the existence of appraisals 
as represented by Carol Klas regarding the market value of the 
property. 
23. The defendants knew that the plaintiff would not 
approve of any "conditions"1 or "exceptions" to the Earnest 
Money Sales Agreement at the time of its execution and delivery 
to the plaintiff and were advised that if they desired to 
purchase the property, the purchase would have to .be on the 
basis that there were no contingencies, exceptions, or 
conditions of sale other than as set forth in the Earnest Money 
Sales Agreement. 
24. The Earnest Money Sales Agreement and offer to 
purchase the subject property at a price of $175,000 was among 
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KLAS V. VAN WAGONER PAGE TEN FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
28. The plaintiff did not make any fraudulent 
representations or misrepresentations relative to the terms and 
provisions of the sale and purchase of the property. The 
defendants, however, were negotiating on the understanding 
there were appraisals and the appraisals were in writing, 
29. The market pertaining to the value of the property in 
question diminished or softened between the date of the 
contract of August, 1987, and the sale of the property by the 
plaintiff in April, 1988. 
30. In the course of negotiations between the defendants 
and Carol Klas, there existed the Devere Kent appraisal valuing 
the property at $165,000, the existence of which was unknown to 
defendants, and 'if known, would have made a material difference 
in their offer to buy the subject property. This was a 
unilateral mistake on the part of the defendants which was 
fundamental and substantial. The Devere Kent appraisal was 
never provided by Carol Klas in spite of defendants7 request 
for copies of appraisals. In this regard, the Court does not 
find any fraud or misrepresentation on the part of the 
plaintiff. 
31. The defendants considered the price of $175,000 as 
being a reasonable price for the property in question at the 
time the offer to purchase was submitted and executed by them, 
KLAS V VAN WAGONER PAGE ELEVEN FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
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5* The plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed. 
6. The Earnest Money Agreement is rescinded and is void 
and of no force or effect. 
7. The defendant's Counterclaim is dismissed, 
8. Each party is to bear his own attorney's fees, costs 
and expenses of litigation. 
Dated thisry — day of May, 1990. 
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EXHIBIT C 
Wlvtt f :) I I OVJJ. • a n n o t a ' I K ' ' l| ' , • M l O > J I < • 
Amended Findings of Fact which support the trial court's 
ruling :::>n unilateral mistake and rescission. The paragraphs 
a p p e a r court•s Amended 
Findings of Fact. 
Tii i s annotation intended tun he an exhaustive 
summary of the evidence which supports all (if the tiia! 
court's findings *!" JC!" ' Oi ill j th :: 5€ f.1 ml 1 m i s ml I iii I ' t In 111 Hi 
relate • .,, ^  unilateral mistake and rescission are 
listed belov ndeed, some portions of particular findings of 
fact" • • he se j: or t:i :: 1: 1 5 ar • = i r 1: ell e /a n t 1:. :: I h •» 
court's ruling on unilateral mistake. These annotations 
simply indicate that there was sufficient testimony given 
;>1 fact , 
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FAC I" 
relevant * aes involved, the 
simple n«l sa ,1 c;i 
property. 
Testimony of John H. Klasi "Q. In the decree c f 
divorce, as granted were you awarded that home as 
your sole and separate property? A. Yes I w a s " 
(Transcript, Vol. I# at p.7, 1.8-11). 
1 
3. In late July or early August, 1987, the subject 
property was offered for sale pursuant to the terms of a 
decree of divorce in Civil No. D-86-1705, in the District 
Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
Testimony of John H. Klas: "Q. When did you first, 
to the best of your knowledge, have an occasion to 
talk to Carol about your intention to sell the home 
or what you expected to get out of it? A. It was 
either June or July of 1987." (Transcript, Vol. I, 
at p.18, 1.5-9). 
HQ. Well, this is what Ifm — did there come a 
point in time when you had a conversation with her 
and told her it was your desire that the home be 
exposed to the market and sold? A. There is no 
question about that. That was understood right 
from the beginning. Q. But did you tell her that? 
A. Yes I did. Q. Would this have been around 
June/July time frame of 1987? A. Yes, I would say 
June of 1987.11 (Transcript, Vol. I, at p. 19, 1.18-
25, p.20, 1.1-3.) 
Testimony of Carol Klas: ffQ. In approximately 
when did the election or the determination come 
about when he decided the home would be put on the 
market? A. I believe it would have been following 
the decree of divorce, because I had to make plans 
at that time whether to move out, find a job, and 
so we talked about this issue of remaining in the 
home and being there. Because he had already moved 
out and th€>re would be someone there to show the 
home. So, it would have been I would say June, 
after the middle of June.11 (Transcript, Vol. II, 
at p.82, 1.25, p.83, 1.1-9). 
4. Pursuant to the provisions of the aforesaid Decree 
of Divorce, the former wife of the plaintiff, Carol Klas, 
undertook the marketing of the property and said property was 
not listed with a real estate broker. The plaintiff John H. 
Klas did not set a specific asking price for the property. 
2 
Testimony of John Klas. iHeie John HI i reads a 
portion of his divorce decree] "A If the 
defendant, prior to September 1, 1987, finds a 
buyer who is willing and able and ready to purchase 
the Berkley Street property at a price and upon 
terms acceptable to the plaintiff, the plaintiff 
shall pay to the defendant as a one - time finders 
fee for her services In showing the house and 
finding a buyer a sum equivalent to 3% of the gross 
sale price of the residence.tf (Transcript, Vol. I, 
at p.8, 1.2-11)« 
m^m After this conversation occurred, do you know 
what then transpired or happened from the 
standpoint of marketing the property? A. Well, I 
was aware of the fact because I drove past the home 
on occasion, that there was a sign in front of the 
yard that the home was for sale. I was aware of 
the fact that she contemplated having open houses 
in the home because she had told me that she 
intended to do that. I was aware of the fact that 
she intended to advertise the home because I saw 
the ads in the Salt Lake Tribune and the Deseret 
News advertising the home," fTranscript, Vol. T 
at p.20, 1.17-25, p.21, 1 I Ij 
Testimony of Carol Klas: "Q. And during that 
period of time, did you undertake to find a buyer 
for the home that you were residing in on Berkley 
Street, which is the subject of this litigation? 
A, That is correct.11 (Transcript, Vol, TT, at 
p.81, 1.6-10). 
"A. He gave me some guidelines to follow. We drew 
up an ad. I primarily wrote the ad. He reviewed 
it and said it would be acceptable to him, And it 
was placed in the Salt Lake in something called the 
newspaper agency which incorporates the Deseret and 
Salt Lake Tribune." (Transcript, Vol. II, at p.83, 
1.16-21). 
f,Q. Did you do anything other than put the ad in 
the paper? Did you conduct an open house or make 
any effort that way? A. I believe, if I recall my 
memory, the Sunday indicated open house. I don't 
remember having an open house on Saturdays, but I 
did it primarily on the weekend. Yes, and I felt 
the response was very good, particularly by owner. 
. . , Q. When is the first open house that you 
can recall that was conducted in connection with 
the ad that was placed in the paper? A. About the 
j 
18th of July." (Transcript, Vol. II, at p.84, 
1.25, p.85, 1.1-7, 1.13-16). 
5« In 1986, plaintiff acquired an appraisal by Devere 
Kent (the Kent appraisal) for mortgage loan purposes. That 
appraisal showed a market value of $165,000. In anticipation 
of the sale of said property in 1987, plaintiff had personal 
acquaintances, engaged in real estate practice, provide 
opinion appraisals on the current value of the property which 
were oral in nature, and used by plaintiff as a basis for 
establishing the market value for sale of the property. Said 
opinion appraisals ranged from $175,000 to $192,000. 
Testimony of John Klas: MA. Mr. Kent is an 
appraiser who lives in Kerns, Utah. And what his 
qualifications are I am not familiar with. He 
apparently does work for Chase Manhattan Bank. 
Carol and I were in the process of applying for a 
second mortgage loan on the home prior to our 
divorce and Chase Manhattan Bank had asked him to 
make an appraisal for the home on it. Because 
banks are extremely conservative in their lending 
policies and they want to make sure that the value 
is reflected to secure the loan that they are 
making. And he was placed to make the appraisal at 
the suggestion of Chase Manhattan Bank. Q. Now, 
that was in connection with this financing that you 
and your then wife, Carol, contemplated? A. 
Thatfs true." (Transcript, Vol. I, at p.32, 1.18-
25, p.33, 1.1-10). 
Testimony of Carol Klas: MQ. In the Chase 
Manhattan item we referred to, was that an effort 
to maintain separate financing on the home through 
Chase Manhattan? A. That would have been in 86. 
Q. That was the efforts; you were going to obtain 
some separate mortgage? A. Yes, to pay off some 
loans. Q. And an appraisal was performed in 
connection with that effort? A. Yes. I was not 
aware of it at the time because the property was in 
my name and John just asked me to come in and sign. 
So, I was not aware of the appraisal until some 
time later. Q. Sometime later after what? A. 
Uhm, perhaps when John and I were discussing what 
4 
he would enter as a consideration." (Transcript, 
Vol. II, at p.130, 1.8-23). 
Testimony of Kathrvn Van Wagoner: "A. And the 
next question I asked was: fHow much is the house?1 
and she, right then said, fWe don't have a firm 
asking price.1 And I said, ''Do you have any 
appraisals?1 was my next question. And she said, 
•Yes. They range from $175 to somewhere in the low 
$190's.f And during that conversation, she told me 
about where the three came from. She did not tell 
me which one was which. She just mentioned 'One is 
from American Savings; that's where John is 
employed. Vick Ayers has given us another one. He 
is a good friend of Johns.f He is with Gump & 
Ayers so 1 knew his name. I knew he was well known 
in real estate. And then the third name she 
mentioned was Mr. Howard Badger, who was a neighbor 
on Berkley Street who had been a principle of 
Badger/Jensen Reality for years. So, I knew those 
three names from that conversation that Saturday 
night, Q. Did you specifically ask for 
appraisals? A. Yes. Q You have no doubt in 
your mind about that? A. No.ff (Transcript, Vol. 
II, at p.148, 1.15-25, p.149, 1.1-12). 
6. T- 1~ a" ------ — early August, 1987, the defendants 
inspected the property in - - * presence of carol Klas and 
H x|; ressn' I I' 11 yfa 1 ut - • ,,. *. . nij t, tie property. 
Testimony of Mark 0. Van Wagoner: MQ. And did she 
reveal anything else to you as a result of that 
initial conversation? A. Well, she said that 
Carol would be in the house the next day and that 
we could go over and look at the house and talk to 
her some more about it. Q. Did you go over and 
look at the house? A- We did, Q. And how long 
did you spend looking at the home and inspecting 
it? A. Well, overall we spent a lot of time. On 
the next day, 1 think we spent a good deal of 
time." (Transcript, Vol . T at p 93 , 3 19-25, 
P.94, - 4 ) . 
Testimony of Kathryn Van Wagoner; f,A. Well before 
the conversation ended, I asked her if we could 
comci and see the house. Q. And did you schedule 
an appointment? A. Yes for the next day. Q. Did 
you go to the house on the next day? A. Yes, Q. 
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What did you do? A. We went through it. And we 
liked it* I had never been inside. That was the 
first time I had been inside, From the outside, we 
had always admired the house. It was attractive 
and it was always well maintained. And I think we, 
what we were looking for initially, it was just to 
see if it would work. Q. On the visit — when did 
this visit to the house occur, as best you recall? 
A. It was a Sunday and it was in the afternoon. I 
believe that the time that Carol said was probably 
right. I have no recollection of the exact time. 
It was not dark, though. It was not dusky; it was 
afternoon. It was a nice, summer afternoon. Q. 
Was this on the weekend of the 24th holiday? A. 
Yes, it was, the Sunday after the July 24th 
holiday." (Transcript, Vol. II, at p.149, 1.16-25, 
p.150, 1.1-15). 
Testimony of Carol Klas: "Q. Alright, and tell 
the court, if you will, the first date that you can 
recall that the Van Wagoners contacted you with 
reference to the subject property? A. The 25th, I 
believe. It would have been a Saturday. Q. Of 
July? A. Of July. Q. Of 1987? A. That is 
correct. Q. And how did you recall that 
particular date? Is there some way that you can 
tie it to that? A. Because it was the day before 
my open house on the 26th. And they specifically 
asked if they could come over prior to the time. I 
think it was listed at 1:30 or 2:00 and they asked 
if they could come over before. And I agreed.11 
(Transcript, Vol. II, at p.8(5, 1.7-23). 
7. In the course of defendants1 contact with Carol 
Klas, prior to August 11, 1987, references were made to the 
effect that she understood "appraisals" had been made in the 
range of $175,000 to $192,000, which defendants believed to be 
of a written nature, however, there is a dispute whether 
plaintiff or Carol Klas represented that "written11 appraisals 
existed. 
Testimony of Mark O. Van Wagoner: "A. Well, I 
asked Kathryn if they had no price, how could we 
know whether we could be interested in the house? 
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And she told me that in the conversation with Carol 
Klas that she had suggested that their was a range 
of market values set by three appraisals of the 
property and that some offer in that range of 
market value would be acceptable. Q. Did she tell 
you what the range was? A. Yes. The range was 
from --my recollection is the range was from $170 
to the mid $190fs,M (Transcript, Vol I, at p.93, 
1.9-18). 
"We then asked her what the asking price was 1 i 
the house. And she told us that she didn't have a 
definite asking price; that it had just gone on the 
market; that she was marketing the house pursuant 
to the decree of divorce; and that she had three 
appraisals on the property that ranged in value 
from $170,000 to $190,000 -- one or three or 
something, but it was above $190, but just a little 
above $190. She told me and Kathryn, she explained 
that Mr. Klas had told her that he would not take 
anything outside of that range and that he was 
looking for a very substantial offer. We talked 
again about the appraisals. And I'll tell you, I 
do not recall whether it was at that time that she 
said that Mr. Klas had them and that she didn't. 
But we discussed the values and were they current 
and that sort of thing. She said, yes, that they 
were all available and that's why that she felt 
good about this range of price." (Transcript, Vol. 
T at p.181, 1.19-2S, p.18?, 1,1-12). 
Testimony of Kathryn Van Wagoner; "A. And said, 
'Do you have any appraisals?' Was my next 
question. And she said, 'Yes, they range from $175 
to somewhere in the low $190's." (Transcript, Vol. 
TT, it p 148, 1 ,19-21). 
Testimony of Carol Klas: flA. Then I believe Mr. 
Van Wagoner said to me, 'How did Mr. Klas arrive at 
the price of $180,000? How did he arrive at that?' 
And I mentioned to him at the time, since I was 
involved in a decorative more of a facilitator 
way, I did not know a great deal about the 
background of how he arrived at this, but I could 
share with him what John had told me y Just 
tell us what you told the Van Wagoners in response 
to their inquiry? A. To their inquiry about how 
we arrived at this, \i Yes. A, And I mentioned 
that Mr. Payne of American Savings and Loan had 
seen the home a year before and had drawn up some 
type of letter and had given this to Mr. Klas. And 
the provisions of that letter were one page. T had 
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indicated a year before we had applied for a loan, 
and I was aware there was something to qualify for 
a loan; that you had to have some kind of 
appraisal. So, I was aware there was something 
there but I was very vague on it, I thought that 
would be from Chase Manhattan Bank. Howard Badger 
had given an opinion to John, which John had shared 
with me. Vick Ayers had given an opinion to John. 
He had been through the home. And I believe there 
was one other opinion that had been raised, plus 
the fact that — I just canft recall. I think 
there was one other opinion - Vick Ayers and Howard 
Badger. I believe those were the main ones. And 
they had all come up. And I believe I said at that 
time, fMr. Klas is looking at a range from about 
$170 up to $190 or a little over $190." 
(Transcript, Vol. II, at p.90, 1.4-25, p.91, 1.1-
16) . 
9. Carol Klas presented the offer to her former 
husband, John H. Klas, who accepted the same on August 11, 
1987, and a closing date of September 15, 1987 was agreed upon 
by the parties and the premises were vaicated in anticipation 
of the closing. The sales price for the premises was 
$175,000, which was the lowest price of the opinion appraisals 
provided by Carol Klas. 
Testimony of John Klas: "A. Yfes. And in early 
August, approximately August 7th of 1987, Carol 
brought an earnest money agreement signed by Mark 
Van Wagoner & Kathryn Van Wagoner to me at my 
office." (Transcript, Vol. I. at p.21, 1.14-17). 
Testimony of Carol Klas: "Q. And did you then, in 
fact, take the document to his office downtown? A. 
I did at American Savings. Q. And did you deliver 
it to him? A. I did." (Transcript, Vol. II, at 
p.98, 1.20-24). 
19. Defendants were unaware of the "Kent" appraisal and 
were under the belief that the lowest appraisal referred to by 
8 
Carol Klas was the lowest appraisal on * :-><- property The 
"Kent" appraisal, if known, to the defe-^ i "^ - . ma i*t 
c •»!ii,:ie i 'in t h e i r o f f e r t o subject 
property. 
Testimony of Mark 0. Van Wagoner: "A. I said, 
•The appraisal had come back at $137,000 I need 
your appraisals.1 Q. What did Mr. Klas respond? 
A. He said, 'I'll get them.1 Q. What happened 
then? A. About thirty minutes later, Mr. Klas 
came into my office. Q. And what happened? A, 
He had in his hand an appraisal by Devere Kent made 
in 1986. He handed it to me and said, 'Here; this 
ought to help, ' Q. When was the first time yon 
saw the Kent appraisal? A. That very moment.11 
(Transcript, Vol. II, at p.42, 1.1-14). 
Testimony of Kathryn Van wagoner: lfQ. Mrs. Van 
Wagoner, you told Mr. Wall that you made no attempt 
to contact Mr. Klas prior to the 11th of August who 
obtained the appraisals, is that true? A. Yes. 
Q. Why didn't you? A. I thought they existed. I 
had no reason to doubt that there were no 
appraisals. I had no reason. I believe that there 
were. And I knew that we would get them. I knew 
John had been out of town because Carol had a hard 
time reaching him one weekend when she needed to. 
She said, 'He must have gone out of town.' He 
didn't tell her, but she said, 'I can't find him; I 
can't find him.' I thought that when it came down 
to us, we will give him the $1,000. We will make 
this offer and we would get all the papers that we 
needed. We needed an appraisal; I knew that, to 
justify where we were going to be and to go to the 
bank and proceed with the transaction. I knew what 
we needed.,f (Transcript, Vol, II, at p. 162, 1.3-
21) . 
?" Howevei defendants negotiated with plaintiff 
througV nar^ ', Fl^s pursuant • - IVM .in.11 \ 
- * ' understanding the range would i * 
-i.e. property value of t: . three highest "appraisals." 
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Testimony of Mark 0. Van Wagoner: MQ. And did she 
reveal anything else to you as a result of that 
initial conversation? A. Well, she said that 
Carol would be in the house the next day and that 
we could go over and look at the house and talk to 
her some more about it." (Transcript, Vol.1 at 
p.93, 1.19-23) . 
"Q. Is there any doubt in your mind but what at 
the time the document was signed by you and your 
wife that the sum of $175f000 was disclosed as the 
sales price? A. Yes, it was disclosed as the 
price that Carol told me John would accept if I 
offered it to him." (Transcript, Vol. I, at p.98, 
1.10-15). 
"A. Carol Klas told me — and I donft know that 
this is true — that John was a very difficult 
person; that he would not look kindly on an 
exception. That if we wanted to get the house — 
and she knew I wanted it — that I would have to 
let her show me and lead me through how to get it; 
and that there could be no condition, exceptions or 
other kinds of things written into the earnest 
money." (Transcript, Vol. I, at p.101, 1.18-25). 
"Q. So, when you were dealing with her, there was 
no doubt in your mind but what Mr. Klas was the 
owner of the property. A. No." (Transcript, Vol. 
I, at p.103, 1.23-25, p.104, 1.1). 
12. Although the defendants had opportunity to 
investigate the issue of fair market value of the property 
prior to execution of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement of 
August 7, 1987, they continued to rely upon the existence of 
appraisals as represented by Carol Klas regarding the market 
value of the property. 
Testimony of Kathrvn Van Wagoner: "Q. Mrs. Van 
Wagoner, you told Mr. Wall that you made no attempt 
to contact Mr. Klas prior to the 11th of August to 
obtain the appraisals, is that true? A. Yes. Q. 
Why didnft you question Mark? A. I thought they 
existed. I had no reason to doubt that there were 
no appraisals. I had no reason. I believe that 
10 
there were. And I knew we would get them. _ 
John had been out of town because Carol had a hard 
time reaching one weekend when she needed to. She 
said, he must have gone out of town. He didn't 
tell her, but she said, fI canft find him; I can't 
find him.1 I thought when it came down to us, we 
will give him the $1,000. We will make this offer 
and we would get all the papers that we needed. We 
needed an appraisal; I knew that to justify where 
we were going to be and go to the bank and proceed 
with the transaction, 1 knew what we needed.11 
(Transcript, Vol, II,, at ][::; 1 62, ] 3-21) , 
2 8. The de fendant * however i »« r ° ri egot iat ing on the 
uere we ippraisals and - appraisals were in 
writing. 
Testimony of 'Mark 0. Van wagoner; lfQ. I take -it 
from what I have heard in your counsels opening 
statement and other comments, that it is your claim 
or contention that there was some representation 
about the existence of appraisals as being a 
relevant factor in this case, correct? A. Thatfs 
correct.fi (Transcript, Vol. I, at p, 101, 1 3-8). 
""A. Well, we had some truncated conversations in 
which I told Mr. Klas that I had to have the 
appraisals that I had been told existed." 
(Transcript, Vol. II, at p.43, J .8-3 0), 
• •••. • ' 3 0 . ' ' I i t ' s e o f in qirit i ,it, n iriis fcwi.ween i n e aet efiiiiai'ii,!1:'. 
and Carol ! there existed the Devere Kent appraisal 
valuing the property at $165,000, ->x si*enr«- •>• which was 
u n k x i n wi i I i l e J ; e t i d a n l « n I i il 
material difference their offer subject 
property unilateral mistake the part of the 
d . ~„r rhe Devere 
Kent appraisal was never provided by Carol Klas in spite of 
II 1 
defendants1 request for copies of appraisals• In this regard, 
the Court does not find any fraud or misrepresentation on the 
part of the plaintiff* 
Testimony of Mark 0. Van Wagoner; "Q. Mr. Van 
Wagoner, if you will recall before the lunch hour, 
we were discussing a telephone conversation between 
you and Mr. Cowley on September 23, 1987; do you 
recall that? A. Yes. Q. After that telephone 
call on September 23rd, what was the next thing 
that happened with regard to the Berkley property? 
A. Well, I told Kathryn about the $161 offer. And 
we talked about whether it would be possible to do 
that in view of the fact that there was an 
appraisal for $137." (Transcript, Vol. II, at 
p.70, 1.21-25, p.71, 1.1-7)• 
nA. Well, I decided that based on what Mr. Dimmick 
had told me that it would not be possible to use 
the $161 figure as a basis, and that I would need 
to use the $137 as a basis." (Transcript, Vol. II, 
at p.72, 1.4-7). 
Testimony of Kathryn Van Wagoner: MQ. Did you 
specifically ask for appraisals? A. Yes. Q. You 
have no doubt in your mind about that? A. No.11 
(Transcript, Vol. II, at p.149, 1.9-12). 
31. The defendants considered the price of $175,000 as 
being a reasonable price for the property in question at the 
time the offer to purchase was submitted and executed by them, 
based on representations made by Carol Klas and without the 
benefit of the Devere Kent appraisal. 
Testimony of Mark 0. Van Wagoner; ffQ. Is there 
any doubt in your mind but what at the time the 
document was signed by you and your wife that the 
sum of $175,000 was disclosed as the sales price? 
A. Yes, it was disclosed as a price that Carol 
told me John would accept if I offered it to him." 
(Transcript, Vol. I, at p.98, 1.10-15). 
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32 The defendants made no attempt t o secure appraisals 
IIIII I  IK11 I I mi in I I H-1 I I i n i i i i t w l . i n iiiii I n I  IK I i mi HIIHP R a r n e s t M o n e y 
Sales Agreement was entered into by the p a r t i e s , because of 
representat ions made by Carol Klas, there were "appraisals" in 
IP * i s l em e. 
Testimony of Mark 0. Van Wagoner: "Q. Is there 
any doubt in your mind but what at the time the 
document was signed by you and your wife that the 
sum of $175,000 was disclosed as the sales price? 
A. Yes, it was disclosed as a price that Carol 
told me John would accept if I offered it to him." 
(Transcript, Vol. I at: p 98 ] 10-15) . 
Testimony of Kathrvn Van Wagoner: "Q. Mrs. Van 
Wagoner, you told Mr. Wall that you made no attempt 
to contact Mr. Klas prior to the 11th of August to 
obtain the appraisals, is that true? A. Yes. Q. 
Why didn't you? A. 1 thought they existed. I had 
no reason to doubt that there were no appraisals. 
I had no reason. I believe that there were." 
(Transcript, Vol. II, at p.162, ] 3-10). 
4001.kls 
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